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Introduction 
The Bomb fell on Hiroshima at 8:16:02 local time. The Bomb fell on 
America sixteen hours later, when the White House issued a press release from 
President Truman. The bomb that fell on Hiroshima exploded forty-three seconds 
after it fell from the bomb bay of the Enola Gay; the bomb that fell on America 
had been more than forty years in preparation, dating to the 1896 discovery of 
radium. 
How would Americans make sense of the new invention? Harry Truman's 
statement was a start, the first public pronouncement on the Bomb. But the words 
he pronounced had been shaped in the preceding six years. The uncommon 
people who created the bomb had also created a discourse that made sense of it. 
When President Truman and other Americans first learned about the atomic bomb 
in 1945, it came packaged in assumptions about war and weapons, about science 
and secrecy, about government and citizenship, about technology and progress 
that familiarized this unfamiliar weapon. The sense of these uncommon people— 
derived from discourses of science, nationalism, war, and consumption—became 
the common sense of the nuclear age. This essay traces the (social) construction 
of that common sense during the first nuclear war. 
When Harry Truman took the oath of office as President of the United States, 
he was like the American public; he knew virtually nothing about the atomic 
bomb (and no more about plans to use it on Japan). Truman had been Vice-
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President Truman announcing the use of the atomic bomb. Courtesy 
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President for less than three months when Franklin Roosevelt died on April 12, 
1945, in Warm Springs, Georgia. Thirteen days later, Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson gave Truman his firstfull briefing on the status of the Manhattan Project.2 
Within three weeks, on May 17, journalist William Laurence began to draft 
the new President's announcement of the bomb that had not yet been tested. Three 
months later, Truman himself would be framing public discourse about nuclear 
weapons with this announcement of the bombing of Hiroshima. During the first 
nuclear war, there had been no public opinion about the atomic bomb, because 
there was no public information. Public opinion was not possible until President 
Truman's announcement. But the ideas and assumptions that shaped American 
public opinion preceded the announcement; Truman's words were part of a 
process of discourse developed before and during the first nuclear war. 
That war began in 1939. The first publications on nuclear fission occasioned 
a "war of the imagination" that attempted to fit nuclear power into established 
cultural patterns. But in the context of World War II, imaginations quickly 
focused in a "war of the laboratories," as American scientists engaged their 
German counterparts in a secret arms race to develop an atomic bomb. At the 
same time, as they tried to make sense of it, scientists and policymakers of the 
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American Manhattan Project developed a discourse of the atomic bomb. They 
invented both a bomb and an intellectual, institutional, and attitudinal framework 
that conditioned the way they used it and explained it. Both the Bomb and the 
discourse were revealed to the common people in Truman's announcement.3 
Between 1939 and 1945, the uncommon people who knew about the Bomb 
created a story (partly history) to make sense of the Bomb by accepting some 
interpretations of nuclear weapons and rejecting others. By privileging some 
ideas, the American atomic elite created what Michel Foucault calls a "regime of 
truth." In a regime of truth, dominant groups exercise the power to control 
definitions, meanings, representations, and processes of inquiry so that their 
interests seem rational, natural, and inevitable; Jeff Smith describes this process 
as "the cultural production of common sense."4 
The creation of common sense also requires the cultural production of 
nonsense (literally "non-sense"), because the criteria for inclusion are also 
criteria for exclusion. Privileging some ideas and ways of thinking subjugates 
others. These "subjugated knowledges" are those "knowledges that have been 
disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive 
knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of 
cognition or scientificity."5 
This classification of knowledges is part of the process of discourse, which 
James V. Wertsch simply defines as "patterns of thinking and speaking." Wertsch 
suggests that our modes of discourse define who we are, how we know what we 
know, how we legitimate decisions, how we frame our own thought and 
communication, and how, consequently, we frame and understand the thought 
and communication of other people involved in the discourse. The discourse of 
the first nuclear war defined who would be heard (and how they would be heard) 
when the Bomb fell on America. 
The people who would be heard after the first nuclear war were those who 
spoke in what Robert Karl Manoff calls "the statist voice." In an article on 
"Covering the Bomb: The Nuclear Story and the News," Manoff describes the 
development of two voices in discussions of nuclear issues: 
The first, tolerant of the White House and War Department 
news leadership, was responsive to the events of the day and 
dominated the paper. In its reliance on official sources, in its 
preoccupation with policy, in its focus on government, it was 
basically statist in orientation. The second, largely reactive to 
the themes developed by the first, took root in the journalistic 
interstices—in adjectives, in analysis and editorials, in fugitive 
paragraphs within statist narrative. In its recourse to moral 
authority, in its dependence on unmediated expression, in its 
respect for individual opinion, it was basically a civil voice. 
Although the contrast between the two should not be over-
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drawn, the former tended to be a journalism of achievement, 
the latter one of consequences; the former a journalism of 
causes, the latter of effects; the former a journalism of politics, 
the latter, of ethics.6 
The statist voice in American nuclear discourse synthesized several established 
discourses of American culture. It combined discourses of nationalism and 
patriotism with elements of science and scientism; it mixed the language of 
military strategy with the assumptions of consumptionism. It built on the 
common sense of these discourses to produce its own common sense. 
This common sense was not just expressed but also institutionalized in 
American culture. James Wertsch notes that "the institutional setting in which the 
debate is conducted usually plays an essential role" in determining which modes 
of discourse we use, and which modes are not acceptable.7 The authority of the 
institutions, and the authorities of the institutions, legitimize their pronounce-
ments. The main institutional settings for nuclear discourse in the first nuclear 
war were government, the military services, some corporations, the academy, 
and, eventually, the press. Each of these institutions approached nuclear issues 
with different aims and assumptions, but, for the most part, they conducted their 
discussions in accents of the statist voice. 
In the process, the institutionalized actors of the first nuclear war marginalized 
other established discourses that could have offered an alternative common sense 
of the Bomb. Clerics, for example, were not invited to be a part of the nuclear 
priesthood, so religious discourse entered mainly after the fact. Anarchists were 
not consulted in the construction of the national security state. The familial 
discourse of women (and men) was not considered relevant to the making of the 
atomic bomb. These civil voices, muted and not many in the first nuclear war, 
supply an important "perspective by incongruity" on the statist voice of nuclear 
discourse.8 
Between 1939 and 1945, American culture made nuclear weapons thinkable; 
the scientists made them feasible; the War Department made them explode; and 
Harry Truman made them public. In three sections, this essay probes the cultural 
processes involved in making the atomic bomb, and the cultural production of 
common sense about the Bomb. 
Fast New World: 
The War of the Imagination 
American nuclear culture preceded American nuclear weapons. The as-
sumptions of nuclear culture made it possible for Americans to understand the 
common sense of the Bomb, but improbable that they would see how that 
common sense was created. To begin to see the creation of that atomic common 
sense, they would need to look at the cultural history of the twentieth century, and 
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Enrico Fermi (center) and associates created the first sustained chain 
reaction at the University of Chicago laboratory. Los Alamos Photo 
Lab, courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library. 
especially the culture of the 1930s. 'The atomic age did not start suddenly last 
August," said Harvard's Harlow Shapley in early 1946. "It started quietly, back 
in the 1930's, with the cyclostrone [sic], with penicillin, with the sulfa drugs, with 
radar, electronics and jet propulsion, with rocketry. All these are part of the so-
called atomic age—the age of rapid and new scientific discovery."9 
American culture became American nuclear culture by absorbing nuclear 
fission into its established cultural patterns. As physicists during the 1930s 
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discovered the properties and possibilities of the atom, the culture used its 
discourses of science and scientism, consumptionism and national power to make 
sense of them. 
The first cultural conversation was conducted in the discourse of science. 
When James Chad wick discovered the neutron in 1932, there was not much 
cultural response. But when two scientists at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in 
Berlin split atoms of uranium in 1938, the repercussions were considerable. 
Scientists knew that, if you could split atoms, you could release the force which 
held them together—as much as 200 million volts of electricity. And if neutrons 
from split atoms split other atoms, a chain reaction would occur. By the end of 
the 1930s, physicists were excited by the possibilities that this release of energy 
suggested, and the 1939 Washington Conference on Theoretical Physics was 
abuzz with the news. During 1939, over 100 scientific papers on nuclear fission 
were published. 
Journalists and popularizers began to make common sense of this scientific 
sense. The Associated Press reported on the conference, and soon newspapers 
and magazines began to explore the implications of fission. Their framing of the 
scientific discoveries of the Thirties was a second essential element of American 
nuclear discourse. 
R.M. Langer's "Fast New World," which appeared in the July 6,1940 issue 
of Collier's Magazine, exemplified the process of popularization, showing how 
science could be converted to scientism and consumptionism. Langer, aphysicist 
from the California Institute of Technology, offered a vision of a world of free 
energy with 
unparalleled richness and opportunity for all. Privilege and 
class distinctions and other sources of social uneasiness and 
bitterness will become relics because the things that make up 
the good life will be so abundant and inexpensive. War itself 
will become obsolete because of the disappearance of those 
economic stresses that immemorially have caused it. 
"This is not visionary," Langer assured his audience. "The driving force is within 
our grasp. Reality is about to be handed from the scientists in their laboratories 
to the engineers in their factories for application to your daily life. It is a new form 
of power—atomic power."10 
Langer's essay echoed the theme of the 1939 World's Fair, "Building for 
Tomorrow." That fair, described as "the dawn of a new day," illumines the 
imaginative context in which Langer's "nuclear utopianism" would make sense 
to Americans of the Atomic Age before the Bomb. The theme of the fair, 
"Building the World of Tomorrow," engendered fantasies of a future of peace and 
prosperity for a people whose recent experience included Depression, threats of 
fascism and communism, and the onset of war. Fair officials looked to planners 
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and technocrats—people skilled in science, social science, and technology—to 
lead the nation into a new, improved future of consumption and community. And 
the atom was part of the Fair's fare: the final section of the Fair's Production and 
Distribution focal exhibit asked "Will atomic power liberate gigantic new forces 
for man's use?" Life answered affirmatively, in a review of General Motors' 
"Futurama," a vision of the planned community of 1960, noting that "atomic 
energy is being used cautiously."11 
But the dawn of a new day of nuclear energy at the Fair depended, as did the 
Fair itself, on the ideas and institutions of earlier days. The Fair's futurism rested 
solidly on the past it hoped to transcend. As science fiction became science fact, 
for example, science reporting had become a prominent part of American 
journalism. The "Science Service" newspaper syndicate began providing copy 
to subscribers in 1921, and it added "Science News of the Week" on the radio in 
1927.12 "In the 1930s and 1940s the public was fascinated with the powers of 
science and technology," recalls Stephen Del Sesto. "New developments rapidly 
became news items of a sort that the press was glad to report to an eager public. 
Science stories sold copies, and it is not surprising that more than one reporter 
embellished the facts about developments in nuclear power."13 
In this way, the new frontiers of science became the news frontier of 
journalism, and Americans began to believe in this "tradition of the new." "For 
most people," says Dorothy Nelkin, "the reality of science is what they read in the 
press. They understand science less through direct experience or past education 
than through the filter of journalistic language or metaphor."14 For most people, 
reporting like Langer's "Fast New World" represented the reality of science. It 
reinforced their faith in science, or "scientism," more than it increased their 
understanding of science itself. 
The increased public acceptance of the scientist as an American authority 
appeared in advertising as well. Beginning in the 1920s, and increasingly in the 
1930s, the scientist in white lab coat provided objective assurance to consumers 
that one product was "scientifically" superior to its competitors. A 1928 Nation 
editorial lamented that "a sentence that begins withsScience says' will generally 
be found to settle any argument in asocial gathering, or sell any article from tooth-
paste to refrigerators." The "scientific" slant of journalism and advertising, 
therefore, prepared readers for the atomic enthusiasm of promoters like Langer 
and, later, Harry Truman.15 
The "newness" of Langer's new world also had roots in the New Era of the 
1920s. The Utopian promise of abundance recalled the affluence of the Prosperity 
Decade and the longstanding American belief that "economic enterprise drawn 
by the engine of technical improvement was the very essence of human freedom." 
And in 1940, when 10 percent of Americans were still unemployed, the 
promise of renewed prosperity was especially attractive. But two new elements 
appeared in Langer's scenario: a new isotope and a New Deal. Like a deus ex 
machina, uranium-235 provided the power for Langer's future, while the power 
of the government promoted research and development, and constrained those 
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who might amass uranium for bombs. The New Deal experience helped prepare 
Americans for massive involvement of the national state in economic and 
industrial affairs, just as World War II would prepare Americans for postwar 
military mobilization, a permanent war economy, global power, and the legiti-
macy of the statist voice in world affairs.16 
The virtual inevitability of Langer's "Fast New World" and of other nuclear 
Utopias betrayed an uncritical acceptance of the concept of "cultural lag." 
Sociologist William Ogburn coined the term in the early 1920s to suggest that the 
tensions of modern society resulted, to some extent, from the fact that different 
elements of society changed at different rates. More specifically, Ogburn 
suggested that the material and mechanical sectors of modern society changed 
more rapidly than social institutions, and that culture help people adjust to these 
changes. But this social construction of cultural lag constituted a surrender of 
initiative to the people who manufactured both things and the desire for things. 
It fit perfectly with commodity scientism. It presumed that adaptation to 
mechanical processes and products would remedy social problems, and it omitted 
the option of resistance or revolt against so-called "progress." When the press 
adopted the idea of cultural lag, assuming that technology was the cutting edge 
of history, it gave the imprimatur of science and social science to a particular 
world view, a world view which complemented the even more popular idea of 
"progress."17 
Although the state had begun to explore the possibility of atomic bombs by 
the time that Langer published his "Fast New World," the statist voice of nuclear 
discourse had not yet fully developed. But neither did Langer's article articulate 
a civil voice, speaking to readers as citizens; instead Langer spoke to his readers 
as potential consumers, as people who might buy into the dream that he was 
offering. When Harry Truman announced the Bomb, he would echo this 
consumptionist voice of nuclear discourse. After the war, in the service of the 
state, this consumer capitalist voice would develop new nuances as "Atoms for 
Peace." But in the "Fast New World" of 1940, it was still just a consumer fantasy 
for readers deprived by Depression. 
Images of war and a war system were essential elements of the emerging 
nuclear discourse. The American experience of scientific discovery and scien-
tific authority, plus the technological and consumptionist utopianism of the 
Thirties, also set the context for nuclear power. Images of war, and of world war, 
preceded, obviously, the second world war. Both the experience and the 
aftermath of "the Great War" conditioned responses to the Second World War.18 
World War II took place within a war system, both national and international. 
That system assumed that, in a context of unrestricted national sovereignty, war 
was a reasonable way of settling conflicts. It assumed international rivalry, and 
expected national responses to that rivalry. During World War H, as Americans 
developed and deployed atomic bombs and a framework of discourse for talking 
about them, they also developed analytic and narrative strategies for talking about 
war generally, and these strategies affected the thinking of Harry Truman's 
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eventual audience, and of postwar Americans concerned with issues of war and 
peace. As Jean Bethke Elshtain suggests, "war stories are deeded to us as texts 
of a particular kind. . . . Stories of war and politics structure individual and 
collective experience in ways that set the horizons for human expectations in later 
epochs." Stories about aggression and appeasement, about defense and duty, 
about democracy and totalitarianism, about Munich and Pearl Harbor, about 
neutrality and preparedness, about military science and technology, about re-
search and development, about Dresden and Hiroshima all affected the cognitive 
map of the American people at the end of one war, and the beginning of a Cold 
War. As Elshtain says, citing Nancy Huston, "War imitates war narrative 
imitating war."19 
Images and stories of the first nuclear war also preceded the actual fighting 
and the discovery of the Bomb. From the time of the discovery of radium, 
radioactive substances had been linked with protean images of alchemy and 
science, progress and doomsday, potency and mastery of the secrets of life. In 
military discourse, they had also been connected with cultural images of the 
super weapon that would end all wars.20 
In these images were the evolving grammar and vocabulary of the statist 
voice of nuclear discourse. The bombs would be wielded in the service of the 
state. They would be scientific and technical marvels, the product of state-
supported research. They would efficiently decimate the enemy, and drive him 
to surrender. They might usher in an era of peace, and an end to the war system 
which nurtured them.21 
World War II transformed these figments of the American imagination into 
facts. But the earlier fictions and prophesies—themselves framed by core values 
in American culture—created a framework for the social construction of the 
Bomb's reality. And the facts depended on the frame. Both Harry Truman and 
the American audience for his announcement had been framed by the stories that 
served as both text and context for the Atomic Age. When the Bomb fell on them 
in August of 1945, they had been prepared. 
Projecting Manhattan: 
The War of the Laboratories 
Some of the common sense of the Bomb was created by a most uncommon 
group of men, the atomic physicists—including many eventual Nobel laure-
ates—who imagined, designed, and developed the Bomb. They thought and 
acted in culturally patterned ways conditioned both by the history of science and 
the history of war. The scientists made sense of the Bomb first as science; second, 
as technology; and third, as weapon. The Bomb at birth, therefore, was invested 
with the authority of science, the pragmatism of technology, and the efficiency 
of military might. While few Americans fully understood the physics of the 
Bomb, they did respond to the cultural packaging that the scientists had also 
constructed in the Manhattan Project. 
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While R.M. Langer envisioned a phenomenal future, the U.S. government 
was more cautious, authorizing only $6000 for the firstyear's research on nuclear 
fission. The Advisory Committee on Uranium, which had been established after 
Einstein's letter to President Roosevelt, awarded no sizable contracts until after 
the fall of France in June 1940. Even then, atomic fission seemed a remote 
possibility compared to projects like radar, and no bomb construction project 
existed as late as the summer of 1941. 
On December 6, 1941, the United States decided "to go all out on atomic 
bomb investigations." On that day, Vannevar Bush and James Conant called a 
meeting of the Uranium Committee to announce that President Roosevelt had 
supplied several million dollars for their work. They also made plans to divide 
up the work of inventing an atomic bomb. The following day, another day of 
infamy, the Japanese bombed the threatening fleet at Pearl Harbor and infused 
Americans with the "Pearl Harbor Syndrome," the fear of a fatal bolt from the blue 
that conditioned so many worst-case scenarios of postwar American strategy. On 
December 11, Germany declared war on the United States, and American 
participation in the first nuclear war accelerated. The scientists worked in a world 
at war, and the text of the Bomb would be read in the context of World War II.22 
In designing the Manhattan Project, the government used its authority— 
derived from cultural assumptions about war and politics and nationalism and 
patriotism and science and service—to create a scientific subculture of American 
nuclear culture. Within the laboratories established by the Manhattan Project, the 
day-to-day work was scientific. But the laboratories themselves were also a 
laboratory for the social construction of science, an experiment on the relation-
ship between scientific discovery and cultural discourse. In the Manhattan 
Project, the government acted to ensure that only approved members of this 
scientific and military subculture would discuss the Bomb and shape the dis-
course. 
Work on the Bomb proceeded on three fronts. At first, attention centered on 
the Chicago Metallurgical Lab (a code name for the project at University of 
Chicago), where Enrico Fermi and his associates (including Leo Szilard) created 
the first sustained chain reaction on December 2, 1942.23 
Fermi's breakthrough shifted the main focus of the American bomb project 
from science to technology. On the second front, at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and 
Hanford, Washington, workers attempted to manufacture enough pure U-235 or 
plutonium to build a bomb. And at Los Alamos, New Mexico, J. Robert 
Oppenheimer led the third contingent in the effort to design and build the casing 
and trigger mechanisms for the bomb. 
After September 1942, the Manhattan Project (as it now was called) was 
under the direction of General Leslie Groves, an expert organization man who had 
supervised the construction of the Pentagon (at that time the world's largest 
building). Groves could get things done on time, in part because he lived up to 
his motto: "When in doubt, act!" In the Manhattan Project, Groves needed to 
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coordinate scientists' theories with engineers' plans and industrial production. 
Arthur Compton, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and others recruited the scientists, 
while Groves approached Du Pont, General Electric, Westinghouse, Stone & 
Webster, Allis-Chalmers, Tennessee Eastman, Kellex, Chrysler, Carbon and 
Carbide Chemicals, and other corporations to participate in this emerging 
military-industrial complex.24 
By June 1944, the factories at Oak Ridge could send tiny quantities of bomb-
grade uranium to Los Alamos. The first plutonium arrived from Hanford in 
February 1945. Bomb quantities of both substances reached the Los Alamos labs 
in the summer. The plutonium formed the core of an implosion device so 
complicated that it required a test at the Alamogordo bombing range on July 16, 
1945. The uranium was packed into a simpler gun-type bomb and tested on 
Hiroshima. The Project scientists had succeeded in producing a weapon that 
brought the war to a dramatic conclusion. 
But the final production of the atomic bomb was less important as cultural 
history than the process of inventing it, because the process conditioned the 
General Leslie Groves, who directed the Manhattan Project after Sep-
tember 1942, and scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer. Copyright un-
known, courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library. 
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unthinking assumptions of the scientists and of the American audience in the 
postwar world. The scientists of the Manhattan Project collaborated with the 
government in the invention of atomic bombs, but they also collaborated with 
each other in inventing institutional and ideological contexts that constrained 
their discourse about nuclear issues. They bestowed this legacy to the American 
citizenry on August sixth of 1945. 
What motivated these talented scientists to do war work? How would they 
eventually explain their work to the public? How would they tell the story of the 
Bomb and the Bomb project? Robert Oppenheimer recounted that, although 
many scientists had great misgivings, 
there was another side to it. Almost everyone realized that this 
was a great undertaking. Almost everyone knew that if it were 
completed successfully and rapidly enough, it might determine 
the outcome of the war. Almost everyone knew that it was an 
unparalleled opportunity to bring to bear the basic knowledge 
and art of science for the benefit of his country. Almost 
everyone knew that this job, if it were achieved, would be a part 
of history. This sense of excitement, of devotion and patrio-
tism in the end prevailed.25 
As this summary suggests, science itself would not have been enough to involve 
all of these scientists in this research. Instead, the discourse of science was 
supplemented by the discourses of nationalism and patriotism, and a discourse of 
war, as Project members worked to build a Bomb and to frame the statist voice 
of nuclear discourse. 
Many of the scientists evinced the passionate idealism of anti-Fascists— 
including those who, like Fermi and Szilard and Bohr and Teller, had escaped 
from Europe's Fascism—working mainly to deter the Germans from using an 
atomic bomb by threat of mutually assured destruction. "At Los Alamos during 
World War II," recalled Joseph O. Hirschfelder, "there was no moral issue with 
respect to working on the atomic bomb. Everyone was agreed on the necessity 
of stopping Hitler and the Japanese from destroying the free world. It was not an 
academic question—our friends and relatives were being killed and we, our-
selves, were desperately afraid." Even many pacifists participated in the 
Project.26 
These scientists put their idealism to work, not by individual acts of 
conscience, but by coordinated national service under the supervision of the 
United States Army. They justified their action with a discourse of deterrence, 
and a utilitarian ethic of least pain. They embraced essentially a just war ethic: 
a legitimate authority, the United States government, using the criterion of 
proportionality, had decided that the ends (a world freed of Fascism) justified the 
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means (a world war and a Bomb project). They chose to serve their country by 
offering their professional skills. Their choice to work on the Manhattan Project 
was not at all uncommon; many citizens sacrificed for the war effort. What Studs 
Terkel would later call "the good war" was good, in part, because of its ethical 
intentions. 
Still, as scientists, they began with science and conceptions of the "art of 
science." Among the assumptions that inspired and imbued the work of the 
physicists was a conception of science as a commitment to advance knowledge 
either for its own sake or for the public good. Many of the early atomic scientists 
appreciated the aesthetic aspects of scientific inquiry, and the "virtuosity values" 
that complemented other values in the quest for the Bomb.27 Spencer Weart shows 
that Robert Oppenheimer, for example,.liked 
the way science could give value to mortal life. There was the 
straightforward craftsmanship of daily work, and the vclear and 
well-defined community whose canons of taste and order 
simplify the life of the practitioner,' and beyond all that, 
physics itself, the vbrilliant and ever-changing flower of dis-
covery.' Such beauty and order, said Oppenheimer, in the end 
sustained the life of scientists like himself.28 
Others like Niels Bohr, for example, understood science as "a profoundly 
political force in the world," designed "to set men free."29 
This conception of the art of science assumed the existence of a worldwide 
scientific community, personified at Los Alamos by luminaries like Oppenheimer 
and Fermi and Bethe and Teller. Young Robert Wilson experienced "the 
Oppenheimer charisma," for example, and felt almost transcendent in their 
communal work. Warm personal experiences permeated the Project, making the 
development of a death-dealing weapon a catalyst for close friendships and 
intimate relations. Wilson claimed, as have other historians, that "the esprit de 
corps that [the scientists] developed there played no small role in their success." 
There was excitement in collaborative discovery, and in the curiosity that was 
satisfied by this intense work.30 
But virtuosity and excitement in the scientific community was still science, 
and the focused abstract thinking of the scientists on the Project obscured other 
ways of thinking and feeling about what they were doing. The Trinity test at 
Alamogordo brought this home to Phillip Morrison, who felt the heat of the 
explosion at a distance often miles. "The real point," he recalled, "was that sense 
of direct intimate contact through the warming of the skin. But of course we were 
all awed and silenced by the extraordinary power of this thing which we had 
understood in the numbers but not in experience." Hiroshima also made Hans 
Bethe aware of the limitations of "knowing by the numbers": "We had calculated 
beforehand how much destruction there would be. But seeing it on the film, 
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seeing it more or less directly, was so much more terrible." Despite the scientists' 
eventual awareness of the intimate and experiential aspects of the Bomb, they had 
produced the Bomb itself, and reproduced a way of thinking—distanced, abstract, 
quantitative—that would dominate nuclear discourse in the second nuclear war.31 
The Manhattan Project put this scientific discourse in conversation with a 
discourse of nationalism and patriotism. Robert Oppenheimer even volunteered 
to work in military uniform. Like most intellectuals during the war, the scientists 
deferred to the claims of the national government, and to the concentration of 
power in the presidency. Like many others who worked in intelligence or 
propaganda, they performed "the "intellectual' work of wartime." From the 
beginning, notes Richard Rhodes, 
scientists were summarily denied a voice in deciding the 
political and military uses of the weapons they were proposing 
to build A scientist could choose to help or not to help build 
nuclear weapons. That was his only choice. The surrender of 
any further authority in the matter was the price of admission 
to what would grow to be a separate, secret state with separate 
sovereignty linked to the public state through the person and by 
the sole authority of the President.32 
They would serve the state as specialists, in a culture of professionalism rooted 
in a discourse of specialization. 
But such surrender of authority was not inevitable. Leo Szilard chafed at 
these restrictions on the civil voice. In 1942, he explained his thinking about the 
chain of command and responsibility: 
We may take the stand that the responsibility for the success of 
this work has been delegated by the President to Dr. Bush. It 
has been delegated by Dr. Bush to Dr. Conant. Dr. Conant 
delegates this responsibility (accompanied by only part of the 
necessary authority) to [Dr. Arthur] Compton. Compton 
delegates to each of us some particular task and we can lead a 
very pleasant life while we do our duty. We live in a pleasant 
part of a pleasant city, in the pleasant company of each other, 
and have in Dr. Compton the most pleasant 'boss' we could 
wish to have. There is every reason why we should be happy 
and since there is a war on, we are even willing to work 
overtime. 
Alternatively, we may take the stand that those who have 
originated the work on this terrible weapon and those who have 
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materially contributed have, before God and the World, the 
duty to see to it that it should be ready to be used at the proper 
time and in the proper way.33 
Most of his scientific colleagues, however, did not share Szilard's reservations, 
and they turned singlemindedly to the particular duties and tasks set before 
them—not by God or the World—but by Arthur Compton and the state. 
The experience of Danish scientist Niels Bohr illustrated another alternative 
to the statist voice. Bohr had thought about the implications of nuclear weapons 
throughout the war, and thought that more people—including the Russians— 
should share in a civil discourse about them. In 1944 he approached both Franklin 
Roosevelt and Winston Churchill to argue for both international sharing and 
international control of atomic energy. But the mission ended in failure, as 
indicated by the secret aide-memoire from the 1944 Hyde Park conference. The 
President and Prime Minister recommitted themselves to secrecy and monopoly, 
and to possible use of the bomb on Japan (Germany was not mentioned). They 
also agreed that "enquiries should be made regarding the activities of Professor 
Bohr and steps taken to ensure that he is responsible for no leakage of information 
particularly to the Russians." Atomic internationalism would be no legitimate 
part of the discourse of the first nuclear war.34 
Because the scientists worked under the War Department of a nation at war, 
the military imagination also shaped the discourse of their first nuclear war. The 
War Department understood the Manhattan Project as a potential manufacturer 
of munitions to be used in the war. General Leslie Groves wanted to run the 
project with military efficiency, and he wanted to keep the project secret, so that 
the nation's enemies could not benefit from the research and development.35 
The scientists accepted the essential assumptions of General Groves and the 
emerging national security state. They assumed and accepted the compartmen-
talization of knowledge and the need for secrecy and spying. Because it was 
illegal for the U.S. government to censor mail, the scientists all volunteered to 
submit their mail to the censors unsealed (security breaches would be noted, and 
the letters would be returned for revision), and to permit their incoming mail to 
be screened. They did not agree to be spied upon, but security agents watched the 
scientists carefully.36 
The secrecy of the Project was even tighter outside the Manhattan Project's 
installations, as the government curtailed the circulation of news about nuclear 
issues. The inception of the Manhattan Project had required a certain amount of 
deception. From 1940 to 1945, the American imagination of nuclear power was 
tightly circumscribed, as the secrecy of the Manhattan Project led to a ban on 
publications dealing with uranium. 
The news media cooperated in the censorship of nuclear news. Words like 
"uranium" and "atomic energy," and places like Los Alamos and Oak Ridge and 
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"Ground Zero" was marked by a stake in the New Mexico desert. 
Los Alamos Photo Lab, courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library. 
Hanford, were omitted from the nation's news. The Manhattan Project became, 
in the words of one postwar journalist, "the greatest story never told." As Robert 
Karl Manoff suggests, "The American nuclear experience has been shaped by 
inadequate knowledge and constrained inquiry. The entire nuclear regime, in 
fact, is both an organization of violence and an organization of knowledge [It] 
has its own epistemological structure, its own set of possibilities for acquiring and 
disseminating knowledge. This structure was designed by the Manhattan Project, 
strengthened by the Hiroshima bombing, and cemented every year since."37 
Only science fiction fans and the scientists of the Manhattan Project could 
play with ideas about the atom. And government censors scrutinized both of these 
groups as well. When the March 1944 Astounding Science-Fiction published 
Cleve Cartmill's "Deadline"—which described a lone agent thwarting the Axis 
use of an atomic bomb—government agents visited both Cartmill and the 
magazine's editor, John Campbell. They demanded that the magazine stop 
publishing atomic bomb stories; Campbell replied that the genre was so familiar 
that omission would cause more suspicion than the stories themselves.38 
20 
These assumptions of secrecy and security would be the foundations for 
postwar discourse about nuclear weapons. Secrecy protects the unspoken 
assumptions of a discourse, and constrains what may be spoken and what the 
public may hear. Among the assumptions unspoken to the American public until 
the end of the war: 1) The atomic bomb might contribute to winning the war, 
which is the first purpose of the United States government; 2) All ideas and 
inventions concerning the atomic bomb belong to the United States government 
and, more specifically, to the Army. With the possible exceptions of England and 
Canada, no other nation may be trusted with this knowledge; 3) Project workers 
should only know enough about nuclear issues to contribute efficiently to the 
design and production of the superweapon; 4) The primary nuclear issues are 
management and technique. Ethical and political questions adversely affect 
efficiency; 5) Neither Congress nor the American people need to know what is 
being done in their name. Silence is a way of speaking, and Americans learned 
a lot—especially deference—from what they were not taught in the Manhattan 
Project. 
With the compartmentalization of knowledge in the Manhattan Project came 
a compartmentalization of responsibility. Specialization had technical benefits, 
but social costs. John von Neumann taught Richard Feynmann "that you don't 
have to be responsible for the world that you're in." Most other scientists were, 
according to Laura Fermi, "so involved with their work and under such pressure 
of time that they gave little thought to what later became known as thev social 
implications of the bomb.'"39 
The Trinity test at the Alamogordo bombing range awakened some of the 
social considerations that had been suppressed in the building of the Bomb. Until 
April 1945, the first nuclear fireworks had been planned for the Fourth of July, 
but that proved impossible. Twelve days later, therefore, the scientists mounted 
the Bomb on a tower in an area of the desert called Jornada del Muerte (Journey 
of Death), and detonated it. The result was spectacular: although they had 
expected an equivalent of 500 tons of TNT, the blast generated almost 20 kilotons, 
was visible for 2500 miles, and could be heard at a range of 50 miles. 
Robert Oppenheimer first recalled a verse of the Bhagavad-Gita: 
If the radiance of a thousand suns 
Were to burst into the sky, 
That would be like 
The Splendor of the Mighty One— 
But as the mushroom cloud rose, he also remembered the line "I am become 
Death, the shatterer of worlds." Kenneth Bainbridge responded more prosaically, 
saying "Now we are all sons-of-bitches."40 
Observers mixed metaphors of creation and destruction, of the beginning and 
end of the world, that would characterize so much later reporting of the Bomb. 
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The first atomic explosion created by man blasts the desert near Los 
Alamos in a test at 5:30 a.m. on July 16, 1945. Courtesy of U.S. 
Army Military History Institute. 
William Laurence, the New York Times reporter assigned to publicize the Project, 
recalled that "it was like the grand finale of a mighty symphony of the elements; 
fascinating and terrifying, uplifting and crushing, ominous, devastating, full of 
great promise and great foreboding. . . . On that moment hung eternity. Time 
stood still. Space contracted to a pinpoint. It was as though the earth had opened 
and the skies split. One felt as though he was privileged to witness the birth of 
the World—to be present at the moment of Creation when the Lord said: vLet 
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there be light.'" "I am sure," said George Kistiakowsky to Laurence, "that at the 
end of the world, in the last millisecond of the earth's existence, the last human 
will see what we saw."41 
Later that night, as scientists celebrated at Oppenheimer's house, Richard 
Feynmann found Robert Wilson "just sitting there moping." In 1944, Wilson had 
called a meeting to discuss "The Impact of the Gadget on Civilization," but was 
disappointed by the unimaginative discussion. That night, Wilson told Feynmann 
that "it's a terrible thing that we made." And Feynmann recollects that, in 
contrast, "what happened to me—what happened to the rest of us—is we started 
for a good reason, then you're working very hard to accomplish something and 
it's a pleasure, it's excitement. And you stop thinking, you know; you just stop. 
So Bob Wilson was the only one who was still thinking about it, at that moment."42 
There had been other occasions to think about it, and about the changing 
purpose of the project. In September 1944, the special American Army forces of 
Project Alsos discovered that the Germans had virtually surrendered in the war 
for the atomic bomb. Scientist Joseph Rotblat concluded that, absent the threat of 
a German bomb, he could not conscientiously continue on the project, asked 
permission to leave Los Alamos, and returned to England. But a technological 
imperative seemed to drive his colleagues; they wanted to see how it would work, 
both technically and politically. This is what Oppenheimer meant when, at a later 
date, he said that "when you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead 
and do it and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your 
technical success. That is the way it was with the atomic bomb."43 
Some of the scientists worked, and continued to work on the Bomb, because 
they hoped that its enormity would bring world peace and/or world government. 
Others could see peaceful applications of their research; at the Chicago Met Lab, 
scientists became so optimistic that a colleague moderated their nuclear utopianism 
by advising them not to "talk like magazine ads for postwar plastics."44 
At the Chicago Metallurgical Lab, where the pressure in 1945 was not as 
great as at Los Alamos, more scientists had begun to consider the social 
implications of the bomb, the longterm chain reaction of their chain reaction. Leo 
Szilard persuaded Albert Einstein to write a second letter to President Roosevelt, 
but it did not reach him before his death. Szilard also tried to reach President 
Truman in May, but was referred only to James Byrnes, who preferred more 
orthodox views: the bomb was a weapon, and weapons should be used to win the 
war. Nobel laureate James Franck headed a Committee on Social and Political 
Implications which warned in a June 11 letter that "the development of nuclear 
power not only constitutes an important addition to the technological and military 
power of the United States, but creates grave political and economic problems for 
the future of this country If the United States were to be the first to release this 
new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, we would sacrifice 
public support throughout the world, precipitate the race for armaments, and 
prejudice the possibility of international agreement on the future control of such 
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weapons." For humanitarian and diplomatic reasons, Franck's committee 
proposed a noncombat demonstration of the atomic bomb. The Interim Commit-
tee, a group of scientists and policymakers convened to plan deployment of the 
Bomb, considered this possibility, but dismissed it. They feared that a demonstra-
tion might fail, that the Japanese might expose American POWs to the explosion, 
or that the Japanese might be able to harden their defenses against such an 
announced explosion.45 
In July, Leo Szilard tried to circulate a petition to President Truman that 
warned against use of the atomic bomb because "a nation which sets the precedent 
of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may 
have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an 
unimaginable scale."46 General Groves classified the petition, and prevented its 
circulation. When, on August 6, Szilard asked the Army to declassify his protests 
against use of the Bomb on Japan so that he could publish them, the Army refused 
and threatened to prosecute him under the Espionage Act if he released them 
himself. Szilard's petitions, the Army said, would suggest to the American people 
"that internal divisions and fundamental differences in opinion disrupted the 
development of the [Manhattan Project's] work." Such a conclusion, the Army 
claimed, might damage "the interest or prestige of the nation or governmental 
activity."47 The social construction of common sense required the constriction of 
dissent. The few varying voices of the Manhattan Project would be subsumed in 
the statist voice. 
Most of the scientists of the Manhattan Project did not engage in this civil 
discourse about the Bomb. Many of them had no moral qualms, and they accepted 
the specialization and division of labor that characterized American culture and 
the Manhattan Project. Oppenheimer, for example, told members of his staff that 
people in more influential positions were considering the politics of the Bomb. 
And when the Scientific Panel of the Interim Committee presented its report on 
a possible demonstration of the Bomb, they flirted with the civil voice, noting "we 
are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consider-
ation to the problems during the past few years." But they ended by ceding the 
superiority of specialization, admitting that "we have, however, no claim to 
special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which 
are presented by the advent of atomic power." There were no specialists in ethics 
in the Manhattan Project.48 
The fact that most scientists had been diverted from the social and moral 
consequences of their work explains, according to Laura Fermi, "the outburst of 
words, feelings, emotions and expressions of a sense of guilt in Los Alamos right 
after Hiroshima. Suddenly, to the amazement of us wives, our husbands talked 
of nothing else but the bomb. They seemed to carry on their shoulders the 
responsibility for the horror done in Japan and for the evils that atomic energy 
might bring anywhere in the world in the future."49 Like the Japanese physicist 
who survived Hiroshima, many of them seemed to believe that "Auschwitz 
showed us how cruel man can be to man.. . but Hiroshima showed us how cruel 
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man can be through science, a new dimension of cruelty."50 This sense of 
scientific responsibility resulted in the formation in November 1945 of the 
Federation of Atomic Scientists, and in a frustrating crusade to educate the public 
about atomic energy by demystifying the discourse, including the illusion of 
special competence, that they had created. 
Even more important for the Atomic Age, however, was the institutionaliza-
tion of statist science during the first nuclear war. The Manhattan Project served 
as a model for state-subsidized scientific research and development. "Consider-
ing the ever-increasing scale of technological-production systems, the successful 
mobilization of invention and science before and during World War I, and 
government success with the TVA, it seems, in retrospect, almost inevitable that 
the government and the military, two of the century's most rapidly expanding and 
powerful bureaucracies, should become involved in the twentieth-century's most 
characteristic activity—technological-system building." By the end of the first 
nuclear war, the inventions of radar, the proximity fuse, the atomic bomb, the 
ballistic missile and the electronic computer showed that "scientific research had 
become a major element in national power."51 
So the Manhattan Project provided not just the bombs that punctuated World 
War II, but the intellectual and institutional infrastructure for American prepara-
tions for World War III. Intellectually, the Project provided a precedent for 
scientists to work on weapons of mass destruction; it justified their work in the 
name of national security, and it rewarded them with career prestige and security. 
It also created institutional ties between the military services and academic 
institutions such as Harvard and Berkeley and MIT that would lead to state-
subsidized science research in subsequent years.52 Institutionally, too, it left 
national laboratories at Argonne, Oak Ridge, and Los Alamos that would be 
supplemented in the postwar years by Brookhaven, the Berkeley Radiation Lab, 
Sandia, the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, and Bettis Laboratories. The 
Manhattan Project also established the state's partnership with private corpora-
tions to develop and produce nuclear weapons.53 In short, it incorporated 
American culture into a "gadget" that Harry Truman would explain to the 
American people. 
Framing the Bomb: 
The War of the Words 
On May 17, before any bombs had been tested, journalist William Laurence 
wrote a "Tentative Draft of Radio Address by President Truman" to announce the 
atomic bomb. In 1945, General Groves had hired Laurence to publicize and 
promote the atomic bomb for the Army, enlisting science journalism and its 
scientism in the service of the state. Groves had passed the Laurence draft on to 
Stimson, who chaired a committee to adapt the announcement for Truman.54 
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Because Laurence also prepared other stories on the first nuclear arms race, 
and because the War Department released them to the press on August 7, his 
language shaped the early discourse of the Atomic Age. A science reporter for 
the New York Times, Laurence had written one of the first newspaper accounts of 
atomic fission. At the February 1939 convention of the American Physical 
Society, he attended an informal session in which Enrico Fermi and Niels Bohr 
discussed the possibilities of fission. Laurence recalled his response: "I remem-
ber saying to myself, vThis is the Second Coming of Prometheus, unbound at last 
after some half a million years, bringing down a fire from the original flame that 
had lighted the stars from the beginning."' The next day, in thoTimes, he enthused 
about this "most important step yet made by science toward the transmutation of 
the elements and the utilization of vast stores of energy locked up within the nuclei 
of atoms."55 
Laurence saw science as the religion of the future, and science writers as 
Moses leading the people into the Promised Land. In a 1940 Saturday Evening 
Post article, he had compared the atomic scientists with Columbus discovering 
"a miraculous new continent of matter, as rich and wonderful in its way as the 
Americas proved to be years after their discovery." Mixing metaphors in his 
excitement, he also saw them leading Americans to "the Promised Land of 
Atomic Energy." Influenced by the scientism of earlier science reporting and 
science fiction, Laurence fused apocalyptic and millennial themes, and meta-
phors of magic and miracle, with American technological utopianism. American 
public opinion about the Bomb would be shaped, therefore, by a master of public 
relations who could fuse the various discourses about nuclear fission.56 
Truman delivered Laurence's announcement on August 6. With Truman's 
announcement, the atomic bomb entered the public domain. His language, and its 
assumptions, introduced Americans to the Atomic Age, and taught them how to 
think about the Bomb. The American people were presented with a fait accompli, 
and a way of framing that fate. 
The announcement revealed the destruction of Hiroshima and supplied some 
background for the bombing, including the Anglo-American collaboration, the 
"battle of the laboratories," the location of production sites, and the determination 
of the government to use the Bomb to "obliterate more rapidly and completely 
every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city." Truman 
also announced his intention to seek legislation for the creation of an Atomic 
Energy Commission to regulate atomic power in the United States. And he 
explained that the wartime security system would continue in peacetime; while 
the United States would share the basic science of atomic energy, it would protect 
its production secrets.57 
Laurence had laced the announcement with superlatives. "What has been 
done is the greatest achievement of organized science in history," the President 
proclaimed. "It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the 
universe. The force from which the sun draws its powers has been loosed against 
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The mushroom cloud over Nagasaki. United States Army Air Force, 
courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library. 
those who brought war to the Far East." The Bomb was "the greatest destructive 
force in history."58 
Even as Truman's announcement revealed some facts to the American 
public, it concealed other information, especially the contingency of the Bomb: 
the process of decision-making, alternate assessments of the military situation, 
and questions about the need to use the Bomb at all. The decision to drop the bomb 
was remarkable, not just for its outcome, but for the kinds of questions and 
concerns that dominated the discussion, and for the bureaucratic politics that 
conditioned that discourse. When Germany surrendered, American policymakers 
were forced to consider, explicitly or implicitly, several questions: should bombs 
designed for Germany be used on Japan? did the military situation warrant an 
atomic attack? would a demonstration of nuclear power have sufficed to end the 
war? did the bombs have more than military purposes? Within the government, 
there were different answers to these questions. But insofar as Truman, in his 
statement, provided answers, they were answers only to the questions that he 
wanted considered. 
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In the end, the Hiroshima bomb was dropped for five interrelated reasons: to 
end the war quickly, to save American lives, to avenge Pearl Harbor, to justify the 
expense of the Manhattan Project, and to intimidate the USSR. The coincidental 
conjuncture of these objectives made other alternatives either unthinkable or less 
compelling in a context of total war. But Truman's statement made the 
alternatives and reservations not just impolitic, but invisible to the American 
audience, as he condensed the complexity and omitted the alternatives.59 
The atomic bomb was new to the American people that August, but Truman 
did not need a new language to explain it, because he could rely on patterns of 
thought and practice established before and during the war. Despite the dearth of 
information about nuclear weapons, the progress of the war had created a cultural 
context in which Americans would approve the use of atomic bombs as standard 
operating procedure. Without knowing about nuclear weapons, Americans had 
considered many of the issues nuclear weapons would raise. As Spencer Weart 
observes, "The public . . . could only understand the news in terms of what they 
already had in their heads." As usual, the newness of the news depended on what 
was old and established. Truman, therefore, could introduce the Bomb to the 
American people in the conventional language of war, and, to a great extent, in 
the language of conventional war.60 
In the conventional language of war, Truman could assume, for example, the 
identification of his audience with the American state. In his brief statement, he 
used the words "we," "our," and "us," seventeen times, identifying the work of 
a small group of politicians, scientists, and technicians with the will of the nation. 
He thus continued a tradition of discourse well-entrenched in the Western world, 
and especially emphasized in a world at war. "In the modern world," as Jeff Smith 
points out, "society tends to be thought of as a "we' that is represented as a whole 
by the state In this political environment, in which it is always this 'we' that 
is acting, it becomes very difficult to entertain the idea thatv our' actions could be 
evil and wrong. They are, after all, seen not as mere actions, but as expressions 
of what 'we' fundamentally are." In this way, the presidential pronoun "we" 
enlists the virtue of the citizenry in the cause of the state, since the citizens do not 
understand themselves as evil, and find it difficult to imagine themselves 
collectively committing crimes that individually they would be incapable of. It 
also tends to obscure the particular people responsible for the actions of the state, 
and the particular parts of the collective "we" which benefit most from the actions 
taken rhetorically in the name of all.61 
At the same time, the statist voice tends to absolve the citizenry of its own 
complicity in the work of the state. The statist "we" contravenes American 
individualism and its emphasis on intentionality; if / did not intend to act in a 
certain way, then, the "American I" would contend, I am not responsible for the 
action. Because World War II was a "good war," the American people accepted 
many sacrifices in the cause of victory. One of these sacrifices was taxation. 
Before World War II, although there was an income tax, only four million people 
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made enough money to be subject to taxation. By the end of the war, thirty million 
Americans were paying taxes, the rates had increased, and the system of 
withholding and quarterly estimates had institutionalized the incremental collec-
tion of citizens' money for the national interest.62 Many of the Americans who 
heard or read Truman's announcement of the Bomb had paid taxes which paid for 
the $2 billion Manhattan Project. But few of them were encouraged by Truman's 
framing of the Bomb to think "I paid for that bomb; I am responsible for its use." 
Instead, they probably assumed that the "statist we" was like the English "royal 
we," which does not include the common people.63 
The statist "we" usually exists in opposition to a "they," and Truman's 
statement identified both the Japanese who "began the war from the air at Pearl 
Harbor," and the Germans, who "were working feverishly to find a way to add 
atomic energy to the other engines of war with which they hoped to enslave the 
world." In a strange way, the fundamental evil of the "others" certified the virtue 
of "us" and our invention of "the greatest destructive force in history."64 
As Truman unveiled the atomic bomb to the world, he used both the 
conventional language of war and a conventional strategy of consumptionism. 
Following a strategy well known in American commercial culture, William 
Laurence had structured Truman's announcement as a form of "technological 
display," in which companies unveil a new product line to the American public. 
"Unveiling" is the revelation of progress packaged in a particular product. "Like 
nothing before it," recounts historian Michael Smith, "the bomb exemplified the 
pattern of concealed development and dramatic unveiling that the advertising 
industry had perfected." Although he was announcing a new and improved 
Bomb, Truman could depend on this tried-and-true commercial and cultural 
formula to carry his message.65 
Technological displays are advertisements for particular products, but also 
for the "commodity scientism" that promises progress as its most important 
product. Consumers of commodity scientism like R.M. Langer often mistake 
technology for science, and the production of technology for scientific method. 
Technological displays are ritual reinforcements of Americans' superstitious 
belief in the power of science and technology, and they involve the interplay of 
technological and cultural claims. Technological displays require a description of 
the specifications of the new product, but they also usually involve cultural claims 
that transcend the technology itself.66 
Truman's announcement of the atomic bomb, for example, allowed him to 
describe the power of the new weapon, but also to make claims about the power 
of American culture. Michael Smith calls this the technique of "transitivity," 
whereby advertisers (and governments) can "recontextualize technology" by 
assigning its products "social attributes that are largely independent of the 
products' technical design or function." Truman, for example, recontextualized 
the explosion of the Hiroshima bomb by emphasizing not its slaughter, but its 
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social and political causes and effects. And his announcement started a Cold War 
competition in which the superpowers linked "each new weapons breakthrough 
to functionally unrelated display attributes: the intelligence of its scientists, the 
wisdom of its leaders, the superiority of its political system."67 
While technological displays sell products by confusing technological and 
cultural benefits, they also reinforce ideas about power and control. The ability 
of the product to control certain functions is expanded to suggest the ability of the 
producers to control the world. When advertisers and government propagandists 
convey this illusion of autonomy and control, they also mutually legitimate 
masculinity and technology. 
Truman's technological display, for example, suggested that American 
mastery of nature through the technology of the atom bomb would give the nation 
independence, power, and control over the postwar world. The mastery of nature 
was a familiar convention that placed the development of the atomic bomb firmly 
in the American tradition of domination and control. In the nineteenth century, 
for example, Americans had celebrated the development of hydroelectric power 
at Niagara Falls in the same voice of the technological sublime. According to 
H.V. Nelles, "Publicists and newspaper reporters drew upon familiar agricultural 
images, such as 'tamed' and 'harnessed' and freely mixed the military metaphors 
of 'conquest' and 'triumph.'... The reputation of this Wonder of the World, the 
frightening rush of its dark waters and the fearsome roar of its cascade, were 
known to every citizen.... On the one hand the engineer was locked in combat 
against the forces of nature, yet at the same time he consciously strove to be in 
harmony with nature's mysteries." This ambivalent approach to nature also 
characterized the Atomic Age. "In this arrangement," says Vincent Leo, "the 
nuclear reaction—the physical event—became the mysterious center of power; 
as if America were able to command the wind and the rain."68 
Truman's statement also resonated with popular appreciation of technologi-
cal gadgets and inventions, and the techniques of mass production. When Allan 
Nevins explained "How We Thought and Behaved" during World War II, he 
noted that Americans took great "pride in the careful planning, the systematic 
production of overwhelming armaments, and the skillful massing of strength 
which made large operations so swiftly successful. . . . The modern American 
genius, the genius of the country of Whitney, Morse, and Edison, precisely fitted 
such a war," and Americans found "a growing exhilaration . . . in the vast 
productive feats of America's rapidly mobilized war industries." When the 
atomic bomb was added to "the arsenal of democracy," then, it resonated with 
previous pride in the efficient, automated, and remote prosecution of the war.69 
American attitudes toward bombing had already changed in the course of the 
war. Before Pearl Harbor, the United States had resolutely opposed the slaughter 
of civilian populations by airborne bombs. When Nazi troops invaded Poland on 
September 1, 1939, and invited declarations of war from England and France, 
President Franklin Roosevelt issued an "urgent appeal to every government 
which may be engaged in hostilities publicly to affirm its determination that its 
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armed forces shall in no event, and under no circumstances, undertake the 
bombardment from the air of civilian populations or of unfortified cities." Such 
actions, undertaken by the Italians in Ethiopia, the Germans in Spain, and the 
Japanese in China, were, he claimed, a "form of inhuman barbarism." Within four 
years, however, the thirst for revenge had made "strategic" bombing a common 
element of American military strategy, as American pilots and bombardiers laid 
waste the cities of Germany and Japan, and laid the foundation for nuclear war. 
The people who had been seen as civilians were now seen as agents of the state, 
and consequently as justifiable targets. Incendiary bombs created fierce firestorms 
in Hamburg in July 1943, in Dresden in February 1945, and in Tokyo in May 
1945, slaughtering hundreds of thousands in a raid. By summer 1945, American 
bombers could deliver kilotons of conventional bombs in a day; it was just more 
"efficient" and convenient to deliver those kilotons of firepower in a single bomb 
bay.70 
The process of technological display allowed Truman to put the statist voice 
in a commercial format, heightening the psychological impact of the atomic 
bomb, and increasing its symbolic value for an audience of adversaries, allies, and 
Americans. The statist voice can be seen in the announcement's reliance on 
official sources, its focus on government and national policy, its celebration of 
expertise and technique, its emphasis on causes and achievements, and its 
essential amorality. As such, Truman's announcement marked the end of the first 
nuclear war, and the beginning of the second.71 
"Bureaucratic justification of enormous acts of destruction is one thing," 
observes historian William W. Savage, Jr., "but cultural acceptance of them is 
something else altogether. Since culture functions to systemize values and has an 
internal orientation—which is to say that American culture first serves Ameri-
cans, no matter who may be affected by it, then or later—normalization of the 
abnormal is an inevitable consequence, whether the abnormality in question is a 
talking mouse, a strange visitor from another planet, or an atomic bomb. In the 
case of the Bomb (as it came to be known), Americans had an instant star for their 
various media; and early on, the process of normalization began." Truman's 
announcement of the annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki began the process, 
but media voices soon complemented the President's, shaping cultural interpre-
tations of this new force.72 
American journalists generally considered themselves to be a part of the 
"we" that President Truman represented in his statement. They identified both 
with the nation-state and with its representatives, who made up the "beats" that 
made up the daily routine of journalists. When they represented the Bomb to the 
American people, therefore, journalists' reports were generally uncritical: jour-
nalists also participated in the ritual and rhetoric of technological display, culling 
cultural meanings from the explosion of two cities. 
Media coverage of the President's announcement, and of the news develop-
ments of subsequent days, established precedents for nuclear discourse which 
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have remained remarkably constant. The statist voice monopolized most Ameri-
can journalism after World War II, focusing popular attention more on the 
government's nuclear policy than on the country's emerging nuclear culture. 
"Media are another agency of the dominant ideology," says Jeff Smith. "The 
'objective' mainstream press is essentially a line of access to the discourse of 
specialists who ordinary readers or viewers don't come into contact with on their 
own." Thus, the sources cited in major media in the first weeks after Hiroshima 
tended to be politicians, military men, government scientists, insider analysts, 
and a smattering of policy opponents. Such sources provided information to the 
press, but the information was informed by an assumption of specialist compe-
tence and a particular frame which told the audience "what to attend to, and how 
to attend, within the going concern of American political life."73 
In the days after Hiroshima, journalists generally used the frame of science 
journalism that had been popularized in the 1920s and 1930s. William Laurence, 
for example, had composed his breathless stories about the birth of the Bomb, and 
he fed them to a friend on the New York Times. But the frame of science 
journalism had been bent by the Bomb, because now science was in the service 
of the state. Journalists, therefore, began to write science journalism in the statist 
voice. 
An aerial view of Nagasaki after the bomb. United States Army Air 
Force, courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library. 
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Because nuclear weapons came from a history of nation-states and a 
competition of nation-states, the sovereign state was an assumed element of this 
statist frame. For most journalists, the nation-state was unproblematic, not a 
subject for debate; therefore, American journalism concentrated mainly on how 
the state was managed, and how the state managed its technology, including the 
atomic bomb, not on how the state managed to obscure its own contingency.74 
Because of the unfamiliarity and complexity of nuclear technology and 
policy, journalists relied heavily on analogy and imagery to normalize the 
abnormal. Each metaphor was also a frame for information and communication, 
a strategy which affected the ways Americans perceived and thought and acted.75 
When President Truman claimed that the harnessing of nuclear weapons was an 
act of godlike people, he suggested that they were out of the ordinary, beyond the 
experience of most Americans. When D wight Macdonald suggested that atomic 
bombs were as American as electric iceboxes, he located the Bomb much closer 
to home, and suggested the everyday complicity of American citizens.76 
The first photographs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki reinforced a triumphal 
interpretation of the news. Images of the mushroom cloud and aerial views of the 
destruction of Hiroshima dominated pictures in the papers and newsmagazines. 
These images were made by American air crews, both to record the historical 
events and to offer an interpretation of them. Although they were photographs, 
they presented a selective view of the events. They excluded, for example, any 
reference to human agency; taken from the air, they also excluded any reference 
to human consequences. 
The officially approved aerial photographs of Hiroshima, released on August 
9, followed the rule that "in wartime imagery the United States destroyed only bad 
things." By 1945, such aerial pictures were familiar images in the American 
press. Early in the war, photographs of bombing raids had reinforced the claims 
of precision bombing. By 1945, aerial photographs of cities razed by incendiary 
bombs appeared, but they were labeled "urban industrial areas" to maximize the 
suggestion of military manufacturing, and to minimize the sense that innocent 
civilians had been slain. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki photographs were chosen 
and framed to reinforce Harry Truman's claim that the city was a "military base" 
obliterated by the Bomb.77 
Released on August 11, the same day as the announcement of the Japanese 
surrender, the first images of the "mushroom cloud" reinforced American nuclear 
triumphalism. The photographs themselves did not provide much information, 
because they forced the audience to attend to the explosion more than to the 
bombing. But they were contextualized to provide more meaning. Overlaid with 
"militaristic captions" like the Associated Press's "Smoke and fire reach toward 
the sky as atomic bombs are dropped on Japanese cities," they served as "witness 
to the primacy of American military power, something desirable to Americans in 
1945." But as Peggy Rosenthal shows in "The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud as 
Cultural Image," these photos also came to signify, not just the Bomb and its blast, 
but—in the pattern of transitivity—a variety of mainstream American cultural 
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beliefs: "confidence in creating new worlds," "the energetic go-it-aloneness and 
sense of unlimited expansiveness of the mythic Wild West," "the American 
capitalist spirit" and "competitiveness," "military-technological superiority," 
and "a sense of innocence."78 
As in the case of the Manhattan Project, what was left unsaid said a great deal. 
Press coverage of the human destruction and irradiation was censored. As Joyce 
Nelson suggests, "This total elimination of the bombings' effect on human 
beings—a complete exclusion of the vulnerable irradiated body from public 
view—shifted North American attention away from the lasting corporeal destruc-
tion to what Truman, in his press statement of August 7, 1945 [sic] called 'the 
greatest achievement of organized science in history."' As Life said in its August 
20 editorial, "Prometheus is still an American citizen."79 
World War II was a popular war for Americans; the end of the war was even 
more popular. Because the atomic bombs appeared at the end of the war, 
Americans associated them with the excitement and celebrations of victory. The 
"good war" brought forth—at least for a time—the "good" bomb. Because the 
Bomb coincided with the end of World War II, which left Europe and Japan in 
ruins but the United States physically unscathed, Americans remembered both 
the Bomb and the war differently than other peoples. "For millions of Ameri-
cans," notes Richard Pells, "the war brought not terror and suffering, but renewed 
prosperity and a better way of life after ten years of staggering economic 
depression It is understandable, therefore, that Americans should remember 
themselves not as victims of the war, but as beneficiaries of the war machine."80 
The American people, therefore, greeted Harry Truman's announcement of 
the atomic bomb with enthusiasm, granting—after the fact—the consent of the 
governed to decisions which the government had concealed from them. After 
Hiroshima, polls showed that 85 percent of the people approved of the bombing, 
and 13 percent favored killing all Japanese at the end of the war.81 
The obliteration of one city, and then of two, raised the possibility of the 
obliteration of any city, and, along with their atomic triumphalism, many 
Americans also greeted the Bomb with fear and foreboding. They imagined the 
Manhattan Project unleashed against Manhattan, and some Americans began to 
reconsider the ethical implications of obliteration bombing.82 
Only a few religious pacifists had maintained conscientious objection to the 
war and to the increased levels of acceptable governmental violence. The 
churches were, in general, complicit with the war effort. Catholic journals were 
the most consistent opponents of the policy of obliteration bombing, with little 
effect on the popular mind. But a few people interpreted Christianity to mean that 
wanton slaughter of civilians could not be justified. And they spoke their truth to 
the power of the state using the civil voice of discourse. From the inside, the 
decision to drop the bombs made perfect sense. But to some outsiders, un-
schooled in the statist voice of the policymakers, the sense seemed all madness.83 
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For a few people, the Bomb and its images connoted not progress or 
innocence, but "something radically unfamiliar in the American cultural experi-
ence: a sense of sin." In time, "the concentration camp and the mushroom cloud 
emerged as the ultimate symbols for this war: the supreme weapons with which 
to terrorize and annihilate defenseless people." Yet in 1945 the words and images 
which might reinforce this countercultural view were few and far between in the 
American press. Images of burnt and irradiated corpses, of individual human 
suffering, for example, were invisible to American eyes.84 
For his expression of the statist voice and for his service as President at the 
end of the war, Truman was named Time's "Man of the Year." The magazine's 
cover showed the President, like Zeus, with a hand gripping a lightning bolt, and 
with a mushroom cloud in the background.85 In contrast, in the September issue 
of the Catholic Worker, personalist Dorothy Day meditated on his name: "True 
man." Horrible truth. "Truman is a true man of his time in that he was jubilant 
about destruction. He was not a son of God, brother of Christ, brother of the 
Japanese, jubilating as he did." Jesus came not to destroy, she reminded readers, 
but to save, saying "What you did to the least person, you did to me."86 
In his remaining years as President, Truman continued to rely on nuclear 
weapons. He never regretted the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When 
Robert Oppenheimer told him, in the Oval Office, that some of the atomic 
scientists felt they had blood on their hands, Truman scornfully offered a 
handkerchief and asked, "Well, here, would you like to wipe off your hands?" As 
Oppenheimer left the room, Truman told Dean Acheson that he never wanted "to 
see that son of a bitch in this office ever again." Years later, when a television 
producer suggested a trip to Hiroshima for a documentary on Truman, the ex-
President responded, "I'll go to Japan if you want. But I won't kiss their ass."87 
William Laurence, Truman's ghost, parlayed his privileged position into the 
1946 Pulitzer Prize and a career of dramatic promotional writing for atomic 
energy, a career which helped shape American public opinion in the "fast new 
world" of national security. 
Conclusion 
The Second World War was the first nuclear war. But even the first nuclear 
war had its precedents—in cultural beliefs and behavior concerning science and 
technology and war. While the fighting raged on battlefields in Europe and the 
Pacific, a secret war also was waged between German and American scientists to 
develop the atomic bomb. The Americans won the war of the laboratories, and 
established a military-industrial-educational complex that characterized Cold 
War culture. The atomic bombings brought World War II to a close, but they also 
opened a second nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The atomic bomb, therefore, 
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came out of an arms race with Germany, and contributed to an arms race with the 
USSR. 
During the first nuclear war, another war was waged between the statist and 
civil voices in American culture. In this war for the American imagination, the 
statist voice won. Combining the established American traditions of nationalism 
and patriotism, of science and scientism, of technology and consumptionism, the 
statist voice helped scientists and policymakers make sense, and common sense, 
of the Bomb. After the war, the repetition and reinforcements of the statist voice 
created a "statist ear" in American culture whereby people were conditioned to 
consider credible only statements that sounded like statist common sense. During 
the first nuclear war, policymakers, scientists, and journalists had—in following 
standard operating procedures, in following the patterns of their public profes-
sions, in fulfilling established American cultural patterns—made common sense 
of the Bomb that fell on America in August 1945. 
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